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Abstract
Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin is a major evolutionary puzzle, as is ‘strong reciprocity’ where no present
or future rewards accrue to the co-operator/altruist. Here, we test the hypothesis that the development of extra-somatic
weapons could have influenced the evolution of human cooperative behaviour, thus providing a new explanation for these
two puzzles. Widespread weapons use could have made disputes within hominin groups far more lethal and also equalized
power between individuals. In such a cultural niche non-cooperators might well have become involved in such lethal
disputes at a higher frequency than cooperators, thereby increasing the relative fitness of genes associated with
cooperative behaviour. We employ two versions of the evolutionary Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) model – one where
weapons use is simulated and one where it is not. We then measured the performance of 25 IPD strategies to evaluate the
effects of weapons use on them. We found that cooperative strategies performed significantly better, and non-cooperative
strategies significantly worse, under simulated weapons use. Importantly, the performance of an ‘Always Cooperate’ IPD
strategy, equivalent to that of ‘strong reciprocity’, improved significantly more than that of all other cooperative strategies.
We conclude that the development of extra-somatic weapons throws new light on the evolution of human altruistic and
cooperative behaviour, and particularly ‘strong reciprocity’. The notion that distinctively human altruism and cooperation
could have been an adaptive trait in a past environment that is no longer evident in the modern world provides a novel
addition to theory that seeks to account for this major evolutionary puzzle.
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Introduction
The puzzle of cooperation and strong reciprocity
Human cooperation and altruism towards non-kin poses two
fundamental questions for biology and the behavioural sciences.
Firstly, why do genes associated with these behaviours survive
when evolutionary theory appears to predict that a ‘cheating’
strategy is fitter and will thus drive such genes to extinction [1],
[2]? Secondly, ‘strong reciprocity’ is defined as a propensity to
cooperate unconditionally even if this is costly and provides
neither present nor future rewards to the co-operator/altruist [3],
[4]. Why, therefore, does this behaviour persist as it incurs a cost
and/or offers no present or future rewards [3], [4]?
Much current theory suggests that the first question can be
resolved by punishment of ‘cheats’ who do not reciprocate
altruistic acts i.e. reciprocal altruism [5], [6] and/or by cooper-
ative individuals recognizing each other by reputation and gaining
fitness by only associating with other cooperative individuals i.e.
indirect reciprocity [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].
‘Strong reciprocity’, however, has been observed in one-off,
anonymous encounters under experimental conditions [12] where
the reciprocal and reputation effects required by reciprocal
altruism or indirect reciprocity theory could not influence the
behaviour of participants [4]. Instead, it has been explained by
‘new’ group selection linked to extinction-threatening events [3],
[13], to cultural evolution [4], [14], to gene-culture co-evolution
[15] and to a combination of the last two factors [16], [17]. Others
explain it as a response to conditions of uncertainty in reciprocal
relationships [18] or as a maladaptive ‘misfiring’ of evolutionary
mechanisms in modern, experimental settings [19].
Extra-somatic weapons in human evolution
Human cooperation towards non-kin has often been seen as
unique in nature [8], [12], [14], [16], [20]. Here, we propose that
this very uniqueness might be attributable to unique selection
pressures likely to have been present in human evolution itself.
The invention of tools and weapons is generally seen as being an
important step in human evolution as it enabled hominins to
consume a high protein diet through the hunting of game and/or
scavenging of meat [21]. Such weapons should be distinguished
from somatic weapons (e.g. prominent canine teeth, pronounced
musculature), with only humans employing extra-somatic weapons
on a widespread and systematic basis. Here, we explore whether
their invention might have led to a cultural niche that could have
resulted in the evolution of distinctively human cooperation. It has
been claimed that cultural processes, particularly in humans, can
lead to the creation of niches that change selection pressures to
which individuals are exposed, thereby influencing their evolution
[22], [23], [24].
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The oldest complete hunting weapons yet discovered have been
dated to approximately 400,000 years ago [25], although it is
speculated that wooden weapons could have existed up to 1
million years before the present [26]. These wooden hunting
spears resemble projectile weapons [25] although there is some
question as to whether they would have been too heavy to have
been used as true projectiles [27] and may have been used instead
as thrusting weapons. Recent analysis has suggested that humans
first developed long-range projectile weaponry in Africa 70–
90,000 years ago [27]. Nearly every known human population
over the past 50,000 years has used projectile weapons (e.g. spears
and darts, bows and arrows) [28] and those few groups who lacked
them (e.g. Tasmanian Aborigines) are known to be descended
from populations that did possess them [28].
It has been suggested that the invention of extra-somatic
weapons in human evolution could have had an important impact
on relationships within hominin groups [5], [6], [29]. In many
species, intraspecific conflict has been observed to be of the
‘limited war’ type in which ritualized tactics or inefficient somatic
weapons are used to settle disputes without death or serious injury
resulting [30]. However, in the case of early humans, the lethal
effectiveness of extra-somatic weapons is likely to have selected
against those behavioural adaptations that inhibit intraspecific
violence observed in many other species. Specifically, the
development of extra-somatic weapons could have resulted in:
N an increased frequency of agonistic encounters as dominant
individuals, hitherto reliant on physical size, strength and
intimidation alone to gain access to valued resources (e.g.
mating with females, hunted meat), would have been more
open to challenge [29];
N a greater likelihood that such encounters would have proved
lethal for the protagonists due to the effectiveness of the
weapons and the speed with which they could have resulted in
serious injury or death [29] and;
N a consequently greater symmetry or equalization in power
between individuals [5], [6], [29] as it could have proved as
easy for a subordinate to kill a dominant as vice versa.
In such a cultural niche it is likely that natural selection would
have discriminated strongly against individuals whose behaviour
provoked an above average level of within-group aggression
against them. ‘Cheats’ and non-cooperators might well have
experienced involvement in such lethal disputes at a higher
frequency than others and thus faced a correspondingly greater
risk of injury or death. Providing that the costs of involvement in
agonistic encounters, where weapons were employed, exceeded
the benefits of ‘cheating’ and non-cooperation then such strategies
would have proved maladaptive.
In contrast, cooperators inclined to reduce their fitness in order
to help others within their group could as a result have been less
likely to have become involved in lethal disputes and might
consequently have experienced relatively greater fitness. Providing
that the cost of this helping behaviour was less than the selective
benefit of a reduced frequency of involvement in lethal fights then
cooperation could have proved an adaptive strategy in this cultural
niche.
To test this hypothesis, we employed two versions of the
evolutionary Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) model – one in
which weapons use was absent and one in which it was present.
We used computer simulation to measure the performance of a
range of IPD strategies, both cooperative and non-cooperative, in
order to quantify the effects of weapons use on them.
Methods
The traditional iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) model
The IPD model [31], [32] is a classic formulation of how mutual
co-operation can evolve in a world of selfish individuals and its
process is well known (see Supporting Information, File S1. The
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) model). Each player has a choice
of whether to cooperate or defect on each move. If both cooperate
each receives three points but if both defect each gets only one
point. If one cooperates and the other defects then the former
receives no points and the latter five points. On any single move it
always pays to defect but cooperation has been found to emerge
where the endpoint of the series of interactions between two
players is unknown [32]. In modelling the IPD, this uncertainty is
reflected in the duration of each interaction being determined by a
certain probability or discount parameter (see File S1). Computer
tournaments have been used to identify those strategies that
perform best, with ‘Tit for Tat’ (TFT) (cooperate on the first move
and then copy the opponent’s last move) [31] and Pavlov [33]
generally found to be most successful.
The evolutionary IPD model
The evolutionary IPD model [34] extends the principle of the
traditional IPD model by reflecting the payoffs received by players
in one generation in terms of copies of themselves represented in
the next generation. Stochastic universal sampling is used to
ensure that players produce offspring in proportion to payoffs
received so that those with higher payoffs reproduce at a
proportionately higher rate than those with lower payoffs. In so
far as payoffs reflect fitness the evolutionary IPD model can be
seen to mimic natural selection, although recombination and
mutation are not simulated.
In our evolutionary IPD model a population of 40 players
compete against each other on a round robin basis. We chose 25
widely recognized IPD strategies taken from the scientific
literature [34], of which 14 have been classified as cooperative
and 11 as non-cooperative [35] (see Supporting Information, File
S2: IPD strategies employed).
In each round (see Supporting Information, File S3: Definitions
of terms) eight strategies were chosen at random with five players
initially adopting a particular strategy. To ensure that each
strategy was simulated a sufficient number of times to remove the
effects of chance we repeated each round 100 times per generation
and averaged the payoffs. Strategies were chosen randomly so
that, for example in the initial round, there was an 8/25 = 0.32
probability of any one strategy being chosen. With 100 rounds in
that game, each strategy was therefore run an average of
100*0.32 = 32 times. As strategies were subsequently eliminated,
this probability was adjusted throughout the competition. With
stochastic universal sampling used to choose players for the next
generation on the basis of payoffs received in the previous one, the
game was repeated for 100 generations, showing how each of the
25 strategies increased, decreased or were eliminated over the
duration of the competition.
The performance of each strategy was measured by the number
of times each survived for the full 100 generations. As long as a
single player adopting a particular strategy was present at the end
then that strategy was deemed to have survived. Survival time is
seen as providing a comprehensive index of the performance of
IPD strategies [35] and in this context offers a measure of the
relative fitness of individuals adopting each strategy.
Weapons and Human Cooperation
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The ‘weapons use’ IPD model
The ‘weapons use’ IPD model we designed for this study was
based on the evolutionary IPD model but we also set out to
simulate the effects of extra-somatic weapons on the fitness of
players. Our model works on the basis that a defection is, in effect,
a refusal to cooperate and an attempt to exploit the other player. It
therefore assumes that the more defections there are between
players, the greater will be the chance of a dispute occurring
between them. It thus captures a key aspect of the real world –
that, in relationships with others, ‘cheats’ and uncooperative
individuals (i.e. those inclined to defect) are more likely to be
involved in disputes than ‘nice’ individuals who are more inclined
to cooperate.
When a player accumulated 200 defections as a result of moves
both by the player and the player’s opponents a dispute was
deemed to occur. To simulate an environment of equalized power,
each player had the same probability of being eliminated in each
dispute (i.e. p = 0.05). If either or both were eliminated they took
no further part in the competition. If they were not, the process
continued until a further 200 defections were accumulated and
another dispute was deemed to occur.
Thus, as well as stochastic universal sampling reflecting the
payoffs of players who adopt a particular strategy, our model quite
separately reflected the effects on fitness of elimination as a result
of disputes. In the ‘weapons use’ IPD model, therefore, the
performance of each strategy was a measure of both decisions on
whether to cooperate or defect and also the effects of the number
of defections leading to disputes.
Finally, in all simulations we contrasted the performance of
strategies under the evolutionary IPD model (i.e. without weapons
use) with that under the ‘weapons use’ IPD model to quantify the
impact of weapons use. We were thus able to simulate the relative
impact of weapons use on the fitness of individuals adopting each
strategy in this environment.
Other points
Our population of 40 players lies within the typical size range of
15–50 observed in modern hunter/gatherer groups [36]. Never-
theless we are aware that there is mobility between hunter/
gatherer groups [37] and that therefore a typical hunter/gatherer
would interact with more than 40 individuals over a lifetime.
However, we make the simplifying assumption that transfers in
and out of groups would have had a broadly neutral effect on the
frequency with which each player would encounter the 25 IPD
strategies modelled. This point is reflected in the re-running of
each round 100 times per generation with different combinations
of strategies being encountered in each round.
The ‘weapons use’ IPD model has three key parameters (i.e.
average number of interactions with other players in a generation,
number of defections before a dispute occurs, probability of being
eliminated as a result of a dispute) that, taken together, determine
the fitness of each player. The values chosen, however, were not
arbitrary but based on a population consisting entirely of players
who always defect (AllD) and who are thus at the extreme end of
the continuum of behaviour being examined. Based on the values
selected, in an AllD population there is a probability of p = 0.50 of
being eliminated in an average lifetime (see Supporting Informa-
tion, File S4: The parameters and values used). These values
therefore provide a clear benchmark against which the perfor-
mance of the 25 IPD strategies was calibrated.
Results
The performance of the cooperative and non-cooperative
strategies in our sample is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2
respectively. We found that all cooperative strategies survived,
on average, an additional 5.6 generations under simulated
weapons use (see Table 1), a significant variation (paired samples
t-test: t13 = 3.22; p = 0.003 one-tailed). In contrast, we found that
non-cooperative strategies survived, on average, 8.8 fewer
generations under simulated weapons use (see Table 2), which
was also a significant variation (paired samples t-test: t10 = 7.47;
p = 0.00001 one-tailed).
We were surprised at the success of one strategy in particular -
‘Always Cooperate’ (AllC) - in our simulations. When we
contrasted the performance of AllC with all other cooperative
strategies we found it survived an additional 23.5 generations
under simulated weapons use as opposed to an average of only an
additional 4.2 generations for all other cooperative strategies (see
Table 1). This demonstrated a very significant improvement in
performance (one-sample t-test: t11 = 16.03; p = 5.7*1
29 one-tailed)
for AllC over all other cooperative strategies in this cultural niche.
Finally, throughout our simulations we have assumed an
elimination rate of p = 0.05. To explore whether variation in the
negative impact of weapons use on fitness might produce different
trends we adjusted the elimination rate by stages from p = 0.00
(without weapons use) to p = 0.25 (or five times the rate used in our
original simulation). To simplify illustration of the key patterns we
averaged the performance of non-cooperative strategies and
contrasted that of AllC with the average for other cooperative
strategies (see Figure 3). We found that for non-cooperative
strategies and for all cooperative strategies other than AllC the
influence of weapons use was most marked between p = 0.00 and
p = 0.05 but thereafter the effect tailed off. In contrast, the
performance of AllC generally continued to improve above
p = 0.05 rather than tailing off. In response to simulated weapons
use, AllC improved from being the least successful cooperative
strategy at p = 0.00 to being the most successful at p = 0.15 and
p = 0.25 (see Table 3).
Discussion
Under simulated weapons use, the performance of cooperative
strategies improved significantly compared with an environment
where weapons use was absent. In contrast, the performance of
non-cooperative strategies declined significantly under simulated
weapons use compared with an environment where this effect was
not modelled. Our hypothesis was therefore supported. The higher
incidence of disputes encountered between non-cooperative
players and the adverse effect this had on individual fitness
appears to explain the patterns found, despite the usual payoffs
from the IPD model.
We believe that these findings have important implications for
understanding how distinctively human cooperation might have
evolved. The traditional IPD model shows how cooperation can
emerge in a world of selfish individuals but our model
demonstrates that, in an environment of widespread weapons
use, this tendency could have been boosted to a substantially
greater degree. The invention of extra-somatic weapons has been
rightly recognized as an important step in human evolution but
this is the first time, as far as we are aware, that its likely indirect
impact on human cooperation has been modelled. We therefore
consider that these findings provide an important new perspective
in helping us to better understand the evolution of human
cooperation.
Weapons and Human Cooperation
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As discussed above, the traditional IPD model and reciprocity
theory have difficulty accounting for the evolutionary puzzle of
‘strong reciprocity’ and other forms of the costly punishment of
‘cheats’. The unexpected success of the ‘Always Cooperate’ (AllC)
strategy in our simulations, we believe, has important implications
for resolving this puzzle. With the traditional IPD model, AllC is
easily exploited and is thus relatively unsuccessful [32]. Under the
evolutionary IPD model (i.e. without simulated weapons use), AllC
proved the least successful of all cooperative strategies (see Table 1).
However, despite the lower payoffs that it usually receives and the
additional burden of fighting defectors with weapons, an AllC
strategy flourished under the ‘weapons use’ IDP model. Its
performance improved substantially more than that of all other
cooperative strategies in an environment of simulated weapons use
(see Table 1) and, from being the poorest performing cooperative
strategy in the absence of weapons use, it became the best
performing when the negative effect of weapons use was increased
to p = 0.15 and p = 0.25 (see Table 3).
We suggest that the unexpected success of an AllC strategy has
important implications for understanding the evolution of ‘strong
reciprocity’. The two distinguishing features of ‘strong reciprocity’
are that (i) it is unconditionally cooperative and (ii) it is prepared to
inflict costly punishment on ‘cheats’ [3], [4]. Under the ‘weapons
use’ evolutionary IPD model, an AllC strategy (i) by definition,
cooperates unconditionally and (ii) becomes involved in disputes
with defecting strategies that involve an equal probability of
elimination from the game. An AllC strategy is therefore
equivalent to one of ‘strong reciprocity’ in this cultural niche.
The fact that, among all the strategies simulated, AllC responded
best to an environment where lethal weapons use was common
(see Figure 3 and Table 3) thus provides a new explanation for the
evolutionary puzzle of ‘strong reciprocity’.
Figure 1. Cooperative strategies: average number of generations survived out of 100 generations (without and with weapons use).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742.g001
Figure 2. Non-cooperative strategies: average number of generations survived out of 100 generations (without and with weapons
use).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742.g002
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Our model does not allow players to avoid costly disputes and
thus opt out of their adverse effects on individual fitness as this
reflects a likely key feature of the development of extra-somatic
weapons in human evolution. For, in the resulting environment or
cultural niche, it would scarcely have been possible to ‘disinvent’
such weapons or opt out of their use. Attempted invasion of a
population of weapons users by those who avoided the use of
weapons, and the costs involved, is likely to have resulted in the
death of such individuals at the hands of those in possession of
superior weapons technology. It would not therefore have been
possible to ‘cheat’ by adopting a less costly strategy that avoided
weapons use as doing so would have been likely to have resulted in
extinction.
One argument that could be raised against our hypothesis is
that the development of weapons would have led to variation in
the skills needed for their use and would not therefore have
resulted in the equalization of power within hominin social groups
assumed by our model. We agree that it is likely that differences in
skill in weapons use would have emerged in this cultural niche, as
suggested by the variation in hunting skills observed in modern
hunter/gatherer groups [38]. But this point need not invalidate
our hypothesis. The very swiftness and effectiveness with which
Table 1. Cooperative strategies: average survival time in 100 evolutionary games (for details of strategies see S 2: IPD strategies
employed).
Strategy
Without weapon use
(generations) (p=0.00)
With weapon use
(generations) (p=0.05) Change (generations)
AllC 24.26 47.72 23.46
TFT 44.56 48.46 3.90
GRIM 36.84 35.29 21.55
TFTT 41.44 51.05 9.61
Pavlov 28.75 32.96 4.21
GTFT 41.01 52.66 11.65
HTFT 33.76 35.61 1.85
SM 41.62 47.51 5.89
TTFT 36.62 36.54 20.08
CTFT 45.65 47.05 1.40
ATFT 42.72 45.72 3.00
SGRIM 38.96 49.53 10.57
FBF 40.84 44.74 3.90
Gradual 36.36 36.94 0.58
Total 500.03 577.84 78.39
Note: Average change in performance for all strategies is 78.39/14 = 5.6 generations. Average change in performance of all strategies other than ‘Always Cooperate’ is
54.93/13 = 4.2 generations.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742.t001
Table 2. Non-cooperative strategies: average survival time in 100 evolutionary games (for details of strategies see S 2: IPD
strategies employed).
Strategy
Without weapon use
(generations) (p=0.00)
With weapon use
(generations) (p=0.05) Change (generations)
AllD 8.92 3.01 25.91
NP 18.37 6.33 212.04
RP 34.72 17.93 216.79
Adaptive 24.41 10.67 213.74
Prober 8.10 2.93 25.17
STFT 12.97 5.02 27.95
Handshake 13.55 3.58 29.97
Fortress 3 7.90 3.48 24.42
Fortress 4 9.41 3.75 25.66
HM 12.43 4.42 28.01
Rand 12.03 4.57 27.46
Total 162.81 65.69 297.12
Note: Average change in performance is 297.12/11 =28.8.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742.t002
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such weapons could have been employed would have made it
relatively easy for any individual to be killed [29]. No one, we
suggest, however skilful in the use of weapons, would have been
immune to the risk of serious injury or death if they defected too
often in interactions with other group members.
Our view is supported by the egalitarian ethos observed in
modern hunter/gatherer societies and the extraordinary extent to
which such societies go to suppress potential causes of violence
[29], [39], [40]. It is also supported by a study of the! Kung where
22 cases of homicide that occurred prior to the introduction of
effective legal sanctions by outside civil authorities were examined
[39]. Many of these homicides appeared to have had random
causes. However, four of these cases of homicide were interpreted
as being sanctioned by the community against individuals with a
propensity for disruption and violence [39] (i.e. those likely to have
consistently defected against other group members). We therefore
conclude that it is likely that selection in this cultural niche would
have acted primarily against poor co-operators rather than those
less skilled in weapons use.
The most important contribution that this study makes,
however, is to suggest a novel alternative to explanations of
altruism and cooperation based on reciprocal altruism [5] and
indirect reciprocity [7], [8]. If the patterns discovered in these
simulations were to have been reflected in human evolution, then
genes associated with cooperation, altruism and ‘strong reciproc-
ity’ are likely to have increased in frequency in ancestral
Figure 3. Effects of variation in the elimination rate on: ‘Always Cooperate’ (AllC), the average for other cooperative strategies and
the average for all non-cooperative strategies.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742.g003
Table 3. Cooperative strategies: effects of variation in elimination rate on survival rate (for details of strategies see S2: IPD
strategies employed).
Strategy
Without weapon
use (p=0.00) With weapon use (varying elimination rates expressed by the value of p)
0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
AllC 24.26 47.72 49.49 58.39 51.90 54.46
TFT 44.56 48.46 45.71 49.69 42.22 43.95
GRIM 36.84 35.29 28.93 31.92 30.68 29.40
TFTT 41.44 51.05 47.05 49.76 53.73 49.41
Pavlov 28.75 32.96 35.96 35.37 35.43 36.65
GTFT 41.01 52.66 53.15 52.25 51.05 51.36
HTFT 33.76 35.61 32.30 28.68 27.92 28.24
SM 41.62 47.51 41.67 41.94 39.20 40.71
TTFT 36.62 36.54 35.94 32.96 33.70 37.95
CTFT 45.65 47.05 41.37 45.41 44.54 40.14
ATFT 42.72 45.72 41.25 44.49 41.18 41.35
SGRIM 38.96 49.53 52.51 48.47 51.35 49.82
FBF 40.84 44.74 48.12 48.59 47.62 42.26
Gradual 36.36 36.94 34.79 33.35 32.66 31.69
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0095742.t003
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populations. These selection pressures might even have favoured
genes linked to closely allied behaviours and emotions such as
prosociality, reciprocity, a sense of ‘fairness’, guilt and moralistic
aggression. If so, then genes associated with distinctively human
cooperation towards non-kin would come to be expressed in
modern populations, like those of any other adaptive behavioural
trait, given appropriate stimuli in contemporary environments.
What is being suggested here, therefore, is that distinctively
human cooperative and altruistic behaviour evolved because it was
an adaptive behavioural trait like any other - but in a cultural
niche that no longer exists in the contemporary world (in this case,
due to the development of civil societies and modern legal systems
suppressing widespread weapons use). Another example of a past
environment, no longer evident in the modern world, which might
have favoured genes associated with human cooperation and
altruism, has been examined elsewhere [41].
What could be called the ‘altruism as an adaptive trait in past
environments’ hypothesis can be seen to offer a relatively
parsimonious account of this major evolutionary puzzle. It avoids
the complex and costly monitoring and punishment of the
behaviour of others required by reciprocity theory [9], [42],
[43], [44], [45], [46], [47], [48], [49] because the key determinant
of altruistic behaviour would simply be the frequency of genes
associated with this behaviour across the whole population over
evolutionary time. It also avoids the need for repeated interactions
[5] and reputation effects [7], [8] required by reciprocity theory.
This, of course, has a special relevance to the evidence for ‘strong
reciprocity’ described at the start of this article i.e. the experiment
that demonstrated altruistic behaviour can persist in the form of
altruistic punishment of cheats in one-off, anonymous encounters
where reciprocity and reputation effects are not possible [12]. The
‘altruism as an adaptive trait in past environments’ hypothesis is
therefore capable of resolving this puzzle by demonstrating that
‘strong reciprocity’ could have been a successful adaptation to a
past cultural niche, thus requiring no other mechanism for it to be
expressed in modern populations.
The hypothesis tested in this study is based on the intuitively
simple notion that the invention of extra-somatic weapons would
have made competition far more costly to individual fitness.
Intuition, however, is not the same as rigorous testing of a
hypothesis. What is much less clear or predictable is how the range
of widely contrasting and often complex IPD strategies simulated
in this study would perform in a cultural niche where such a
condition is commonplace. This point is amply illustrated in the
unexpected success of the AllC strategy and the implications which
that success has for understanding the origins of human altruism
and cooperative behaviour. We consider that the resulting patterns
found in this study provide an important new insight into the two
major evolutionary puzzles outlined in the Introduction. The
challenge now is to test this novel hypothesis by using other
methodologies (e.g. a population genetic model) to establish
whether the same effects are replicated.
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